Avian Influenza in 2025: Why This Moment Matters for Pandemic Preparedness
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In early 2025, highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza is causing ripple effects across species, sectors, and borders. What began as an outbreak among wild birds and poultry has now reached U.S. dairy cows and at least 70 humans—raising critical questions about how prepared we are for the next pandemic threat.
The Global Virus Network and leading virologists are raising serious concerns: H5N1 is no longer just a poultry issue—it poses a real risk to public health and a potential pandemic threat. With confirmed infections in over 995 dairy herds across all 50 states, and the first U.S. human death from H5N1 recently reported, this virus has crossed into new territory. Sporadic human cases with no known animal exposure point to a concerning possibility: the virus may be evolving toward more efficient human-to-human transmission.
What’s Different Now?
- New Host, New Risks: This is the first time H5N1 has widely infected cattle, and the implications are still emerging—especially for milk production and worker safety.
- Human Infections: While most human cases have been mild, severe illness and a growing number of unlinked infections are cause for vigilance.
- Mutation and Reassortment: H5N1 continues to mutate and mix with other viruses. Co-circulation with seasonal flu or swine influenza increases the chance of a dangerous reassortant virus.
A Call for Proactive Measures
We’ve seen this before: a virus jumps from animals to humans, and hesitation buys time for it to spread. With H5N1 now affecting dairy cows and detected in humans, we have a rare opportunity to get ahead of a potential crisis—if we act now.
That starts with smarter surveillance. We need to test not just symptomatic individuals, but farmworkers, their families, and nearby communities—alongside wastewater and environmental samples. This data, including viral genomic sequences and associated metadata, must be shared quickly and transparently to guide a coordinated global response.
Inside farms and dairy facilities, basic biosecurity measures like PPE use and sanitation need to become standard practice—not after an outbreak, but now. Point-of-care testing tools should be deployed to quickly detect infections in both humans and animals, especially in rural or agricultural settings.
At the same time, we must strengthen the capacity of public health systems to respond—ensuring local agencies have resources, training, and authority. Investments in predictive tools can help identify which viral changes might lead to greater spread or severity.
Vaccination planning must also begin. That means evaluating existing H5N1 vaccines, testing candidates against current strains, and prioritizing high-risk populations like farmworkers. We should also be ready to launch clinical trials if wider transmission begins.
Clear, culturally sensitive communication will be vital—helping the public understand risks and protective actions without alarm. And across all efforts, collaboration is key: industry, health agencies, researchers, and international partners must work together and share findings in real time.
What Can Healthcare and Public Health Professionals Do Now?
- Follow and share CDC and USDA guidance on H5N1.
- Reinforce the importance of seasonal flu vaccination—especially among agricultural workers.
- Advocate for strong infection control measures in rural, farm-adjacent, and high-risk environments.
- Support messaging that explains the “why” behind biosecurity without creating fear.
Preparedness isn’t built in panic—it’s built in advance. The outbreak may not yet have the hallmarks of a pandemic, but it is providing a critical window for action. There is a cost to delayed response—H5N1 offers an opportunity to lead with the lessons we’ve learned from prior pandemics.
About the Authors
This blog post is based on a recent commentary on H5N1, published in The Lancet Regional Health – Americas journal, which calls for enhanced surveillance, biosecurity, vaccination, and public health strategies to mitigate risks to human and animal health. “Enhancing the response to avian influenza in the US and globally” was authored by the Global Virus Network (GVN), a coalition of medical virologists and public health experts working to advance knowledge about viruses and develop drugs and vaccines to prevent illness and death.
NETEC’s Dr. Lauren Sauer and Dr. Jared Evans are members of the GVN and contributed to the article.
Jared D. Evans, PhD, is an associate professor in the UNMC Department of Pathology, Microbiology and Immunology. At NETEC, Jared is the Chair of the SPRN Basic Science Workgroup.
Lauren M. Sauer, PhD, MSc, is an Associate Professor in the College of Public Health, Department of Environmental, Agricultural, and Occupational Health, at the University of Nebraska Medical Center and both the Interim Associate Director of Research and a Scholar of the UNMC Global Center for Health Security. She is an Adjunct Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine in the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, with a joint appointment in the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, department of International Health. She is also an adjunct faculty member of the Boston University Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases Policy and Research.
She is the Director of the Special Pathogens Research Network, the research arm of NETEC, and is an alumnus of the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity program at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, where she is a contributing scholar.
Lauren’s research focuses on human subjects research in bio-emergencies and disasters, in particular, ethical implementation of research and navigating the regulatory environment. The goal of her research is to provide health care facilities with the tools needed to conduct a clinical and operational research response in emergencies.