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What happens when the next pandemic emerges from a pathogen we didn’t see coming?

On this episode of Transmission Interrupted, Jill Morgan speaks with epidemiologist, researcher, and author Dr. Stephen Morse about the emergence of HIV, the origins of his landmark book Emerging Viruses (1993), and how infectious disease threats continue to surprise us.

Dr. Morse explores how zoonotic transmission, environmental change, globalization, and rapid viral evolution create threats that defy prediction. Drawing on lessons from COVID-19, he discusses what preparedness requires: stronger surveillance, faster action, reliable PPE supplies, better training, and clearer communication.

His message is clear: surveillance matters only when it leads to action. And a lack of imagination and urgency may be among our greatest vulnerabilities.

The conversation closes with practical steps everyone can take to reduce transmission, from hand hygiene and masking to staying up to date on vaccines. Because the next outbreak won’t wait for us to be ready—and neither should we.

Questions or comments for NETEC?

Contact us at info@netec.org. Visit Transmission Interrupted on the web.

Guests

Stephen S. Morse, PhD

Professor of Epidemiology at CUMC Dr. Stephen S. Morse’s interests focus on epidemiology and risk assessment of infectious diseases (particularly emerging infections, including influenza), and improving disease early warning systems. In 2000, he returned to Columbia after 4 years in government as program manager for Biodefense at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Department of Defense, where he co-directed the Pathogen Countermeasures program and subsequently directed the Advanced Diagnostics program. Before coming to Columbia, he was assistant professor of Virology at The Rockefeller University in New York, and remains an adjunct faculty member. His book, Emerging Viruses (Oxford University Press), was selected by “American Scientist” for its list of “100 Top Science Books of the 20th Century”. Dr. Morse was chair and principal organizer of the 1989 NIAID/NIH (National Institutes of Health) Conference on Emerging Viruses, for which he originated the term and concept of emerging viruses/infections; served as a member of the Institute of Medicine/National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Emerging Microbial Threats to Health (and chaired its Task Force on Viruses), and was a contributor to its report, Emerging Infections (1992). He subsequently served on the Steering Committee of the Institute of Medicine’s Forum on Microbial Threats, and has served on a number of National Academies of Sciences committees on infectious diseases, biomedical policy, and biotechnology; and as an adviser to numerous government and international organizations. He was the founding chair of ProMED (the nonprofit international Program to Monitor Emerging Diseases) and was an originator of ProMED-mail, an international network inaugurated by ProMED in 1994 for outbreak reporting and disease monitoring using the Internet. He was appointed to the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in 2014.

Host

Jill Morgan, RN

Emory Healthcare, Atlanta, GA Jill Morgan is a registered nurse and a subject matter expert in personal protective equipment (PPE) for NETEC. For 35 years, Jill has been an emergency department and critical care nurse, and now splits her time between education for NETEC and clinical research, most of it centering around infection prevention and personal protective equipment. She is a member of the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC), ASTM International, and the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI).

Resources

About NETEC

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Transcript
Jill Morgan:

Hello, and welcome to "Transmission Interrupted."

Jill Morgan:

My name is Jill Morgan.

Jill Morgan:

I'm a nurse here at Emory University Hospital in Atlanta, and part of the

Jill Morgan:

biocontainment team here at Emory.

Jill Morgan:

For those of you not yet familiar with NETEC, our mission is to

Jill Morgan:

set the gold standard for special pathogen preparedness and response

Jill Morgan:

across health systems in the U.S.

Jill Morgan:

With the goals of driving best practices, closing knowledge gaps,

Jill Morgan:

and developing innovative resources.

Jill Morgan:

NETEC works alongside and in cooperation with the CDC, and is

Jill Morgan:

funded by ASPR, the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response.

Jill Morgan:

I am so happy today to have someone that I think will be familiar to many of you,

Jill Morgan:

perhaps not in person, but in what we have read over the course of our careers.

Jill Morgan:

So I am thrilled to have Dr. Stephen Morse with me today.

Jill Morgan:

He is an epidemiologist, a researcher, and, as I said, a noted author,

Jill Morgan:

and just has been a thought leader on emerging pathogens, really

Jill Morgan:

for a tremendous amount of time.

Jill Morgan:

Not to age him, perhaps to age me, that his book, "Emerging Viruses,"

Jill Morgan:that was released, I think in:Jill Morgan:

other books, really people's thinking about emerging viruses, pathogens

Jill Morgan:

that we should be concerned about.

Jill Morgan:

And I think it was named, and correct me if I'm wrong, Dr. Morse, but I

Jill Morgan:

think it was named like one of the top 100 science writings of the century.

Jill Morgan:

So really just, just such great work.

Jill Morgan:

So thank you for joining me today, Dr. Stephen Morse.

Stephen Morse:

Well, thank you very much.

Stephen Morse:

I'm honored to be here, and thank you for those very kind words.

Stephen Morse:

Delighted to be with you

Jill Morgan:

So in thinking back, so you you were writing "Emerging Viruses" back,

Jill Morgan:

I'm sure the writing was going on when we were really finding out about HIV.

Jill Morgan:

We didn't know much at the time.

Jill Morgan:

We certainly didn't have the medications that we have now.

Jill Morgan:

So tell me what it was like then, and then I'd love to take you in the way,

Jill Morgan:

way back machine and, and think a-about some of the things that perhaps, you

Jill Morgan:

anticipated or were thinking about back then that either came to fruition

Jill Morgan:

in the intervening, you know, almost 30 years, or were surprising to you.

Stephen Morse:

Well, the context really goes back much further.

Stephen Morse:

You can remember the triumphalism mid-century, mid-20th century that, that

Stephen Morse:

is when people thought that infectious diseases would be a thing of the past.

Stephen Morse:

And in fact, uh, Ruth Bergelman, who was then the deputy director of the National

Stephen Morse:

Center for Infectious Diseases at CDC, when there was a National Center for

Stephen Morse:

Infectious Diseases, told me some years ago that when she joined CDC, people told

Stephen Morse:

her not to go into infectious diseases because that was just a dying field.

Stephen Morse:

So she ended up editing MMWR and doing some other things instead, until she

Stephen Morse:

moved over to infectious diseases.

Stephen Morse:

And yes, I think it's HIV that really made us aware that there were lots of

Stephen Morse:

possibilities with infectious diseases that we had never really thought about.

Stephen Morse:

We had never really realized how many and how varied the infectious

Stephen Morse:

diseases could be, and that, in fact, we had not conquered them.

Stephen Morse:

But there were so many surprises.

Stephen Morse:

HIV was really a great surprise in so many ways.

Stephen Morse:

It was really the first time that we had seen not only a virus that was really

Stephen Morse:

not known in humans; it was known in other animals or other species where

Stephen Morse:

it caused essentially respiratory, sometimes other types of diseases,

Stephen Morse:

but not an immunodeficiency disease.

Stephen Morse:

That was really unique, a whole new mechanism of pathogenesis.

Stephen Morse:

So I think, you know, not only the deadliness, the real threat of HIV,

Stephen Morse:

how much it had spread and how much suffering and death it caused, but

Stephen Morse:

also the fact that so much of the science was totally new and unknown.

Stephen Morse:

Until we went out and looked for new or other HIV-related viruses

Stephen Morse:

and found out there were many.

Stephen Morse:

We just really hadn't noticed them, but they were out there in nature.

Stephen Morse:

So that was the sort of longer perspective.

Stephen Morse:

HIV certainly provided a climate that made it possible to think about

Stephen Morse:

infectious diseases once again.

Stephen Morse:

But in terms of emerging infections, I think one of the issues was that

Stephen Morse:

there was a lot of discussion about where emerging infections came from.

Stephen Morse:

I had coined the term emerging viruses after a discussion with my colleague

Stephen Morse:

and mentor, informal mentor, Josh Lederberg, who was then the president

Stephen Morse:

of the Rockefeller University, where I was a faculty member.

Stephen Morse:

He actually, I blame him for getting me started on thinking about this.

Stephen Morse:

But, from a much more innocent discussion about some, some, uh, odd viruses that

Stephen Morse:

were out there that I was working on, including one that killed the

Stephen Morse:

T-cells in mice and has been well-known for a long time as a herpes virus.

Stephen Morse:

It's a murid herpes virus III officially, but it, it actually, uh, kills

Stephen Morse:

developing T-cells by inducing apoptosis.

Stephen Morse:

And that's something that was unusual and not well understood.

Stephen Morse:

But that got me thinking with a few innocent questions from Josh in a

Stephen Morse:

discussion about the question of what's out there and what could we do about it.

Stephen Morse:

And among microbiologists, and I was trained as a lab scientist

Stephen Morse:

working at Rockefeller, and thought I'd be spending my, my whole

Stephen Morse:

life working in the laboratory.

Stephen Morse:

Little, little did I know.

Stephen Morse:

But the fact is that most of us in microbiology, virology, in

Stephen Morse:

the lab, tended to think about the rapid evolution of viruses.

Stephen Morse:

And there are a number of prominent scientists, including one of my former

Stephen Morse:

professors, Howard Temin, who shared the Nobel Prize for the discovery of

Stephen Morse:

reverse transcriptase, which we all take for granted now, but that's the enzyme

Stephen Morse:

that makes the so-called retroviruses.

Stephen Morse:

That's why we call them retroviruses, because they're RNA viruses that

Stephen Morse:

can make a DNA copy for themselves.

Stephen Morse:

And that lasts forever in the cell, of course, being DNA.

Stephen Morse:

But reverse transcriptase was something people thought Howard Temin was, was

Stephen Morse:

really being heretical when based on some other evidence, he, he suggested

Stephen Morse:

in the '60s that it actually existed.

Stephen Morse:

But it wasn't until the '70s that, Howard and Temin, and David Baltimore

Stephen Morse:

independently demonstrated the existence of this enzyme in the lab, which is really

Stephen Morse:

the key to the retroviral lifecycle, HIV itself being one of many retroviruses.

Stephen Morse:

And, in fact, took years to just demonstrate because of some

Stephen Morse:

technical tricks that were necessary so that it wasn't degraded when

Stephen Morse:

when being isolated in the lab.

Stephen Morse:

And now, of course, we all take it for granted.

Stephen Morse:

Younger people use it all the time in their reverse transcription

Stephen Morse:

PCR kits to do RNA and so on.

Stephen Morse:

But these things actually, uh, in the '80s and '90s, PCR was a very new thing.

Stephen Morse:

Very few people were doing it, and I, I won't reminisce about that.

Stephen Morse:

But, you know, it's amazing.

Stephen Morse:

That has now caught on and obviously, you know, for very good reason.

Stephen Morse:

But it was a new thing then, so we had a feeling of novelty certainly, but

Stephen Morse:

also the virologists and many scientists thought that these viruses came from

Stephen Morse:

rapid evolution, and people thought of rapid evolution as the key to the

Stephen Morse:

development of these emerging viruses.

Stephen Morse:

But nobody really knew.

Stephen Morse:

Other people thought about the ecological settings, and perhaps they

Stephen Morse:

were aware of situations where viruses in other species transmitted to humans.

Stephen Morse:

We would call those zoonotic, of course.

Stephen Morse:

And there was a really no consensus, in fact, which of them, if either,

Stephen Morse:

you know, was responsible for the emergence of these viruses.

Stephen Morse:And so in:Stephen Morse:

with some colleagues at the National Institutes of Health, particularly the

Stephen Morse:

late Jon Lamanentaine, late lamented, I would say, Jon Lamanentaine, who was the

Stephen Morse:

director of the Division of Virology in what was then Tony Fauci's institute,

Stephen Morse:

the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at NIH, and working

Stephen Morse:

with John Lamontagne, we fleshed out a program for having a conference

Stephen Morse:

on emerging infections, or emerging viruses at that time, as I called them.

Stephen Morse:had this conference in May of:Stephen Morse:

Just by chance, there was a hotel being renovated, a very

Stephen Morse:

expensive hotel normally, but we were able to get it cheaply.

Stephen Morse:

And a lot of people, about 200 people attended in the ballroom, and

Stephen Morse:

basically discussed all these questions.

Stephen Morse:

And that formed the beginnings, if you will, the roots of, speaking in

Stephen Morse:

evolutionary terms, of that book you referred to, which was a labor of love.

Stephen Morse:

It took about two years to complete it, so it was a very

Stephen Morse:

exciting time because nobody knew that there was any there.

Stephen Morse:

But it was also very stressful because, you know, we knew what

Stephen Morse:

the stakes were, and we had no idea what was actually happening.

Stephen Morse:

And it turned out that nowadays you can teach this in elementary school and in

Stephen Morse:

grade school, that, you know, many of these emerging infections are, in fact

Stephen Morse:

zoonotic, coming from natural sources in the environment from other vertebrates,

Stephen Morse:

but sometimes carried by mosquitoes or ticks, other biting arthropods, or other

Stephen Morse:

mechanisms, from environments to people.

Stephen Morse:

And that many of these infections emerged, as we called them, or as I

Stephen Morse:

called them, largely because people were now encroaching in areas where

Stephen Morse:

they had not encountered these infections before and now had the

Stephen Morse:

opportunity to become infected.

Stephen Morse:

And this is the result essentially of changes that have inadvertent effects,

Stephen Morse:

but that are actually caused, in many cases, by human beings, like, agriculture,

Stephen Morse:

land being cleared for agriculture, allowing other species, little mice, for

Stephen Morse:

example, that might be carrying a natural infection like a hantavirus, very famous

Stephen Morse:

to the people in your network recently.

Stephen Morse:

But like a hantavirus, for example, or many of the others, including we, we

Stephen Morse:

think HIV to be introduced into the human population for the, perhaps for

Stephen Morse:

the first time or perhaps not for the first time, but now had the opportunity

Stephen Morse:

at times to spread if it could establish itself as a human infection.

Stephen Morse:

And that was the result, to a large extent, of globalization and the

Stephen Morse:

fact that we're always moving and always changing the environment.

Stephen Morse:

And although it's a good thing that we are much more in contact, not in this

Stephen Morse:

virtual way, but, you know, obviously through planes, trains, automobiles,

Stephen Morse:

what have you, you know, it does have, unanticipated consequences sometimes

Stephen Morse:

when an infection can start in some very unexpected or perhaps formerly

Stephen Morse:

obscure place and then spread through transportation, through human behavior,

Stephen Morse:

through many other mechanisms.

Stephen Morse:

Human behavior was a very important part, obviously, accounting for

Stephen Morse:

the spread of HIV as well as the ability to travel worldwide.

Stephen Morse:

And with Ebola too, although I think it, it's not going to become

Stephen Morse:

a worldwide issue simply because of the need for an ecological setting

Stephen Morse:

in which it can establish itself.

Stephen Morse:

West Nile was successful in this way, coming across the ocean to New York.

Stephen Morse:

And then now, it's already much of the world, but now

Stephen Morse:

throughout the United States.

Stephen Morse:

So these are happening all the time as the world is changing.

Stephen Morse:

But also, we have not seen them before because they may have

Stephen Morse:

occurred in a very limited setting and just not been noticed before.

Stephen Morse:

Now, evolution, at the same time, plays an important role.

Stephen Morse:

It provides, for one thing, the great biodiversity that we see in pathogens,

Stephen Morse:

especially viruses, which are known for their ability often to mutate readily.

Stephen Morse:

HIV was a champion at this, so is influenza, and so we see with SARS-CoV-2,

Stephen Morse:

the cause of COVID-19, which, a pandemic we've just lived through.

Stephen Morse:

And those can also evolve not only to become very biodiverse and perhaps

Stephen Morse:

reach new hosts and give us that biodiversity of pathogens, but also

Stephen Morse:

evolve within their hosts, as we saw with COVID-19, SARS-coronavirus-2,

Stephen Morse:

as we saw with influenza and see with influenza, quite often, the

Stephen Morse:

vast range and rapidity of mutation.

Stephen Morse:

So, both of these have a role, although probably, you know, I've devoted

Stephen Morse:

and many of us now think more about zoonotic origins and transfer into new

Stephen Morse:

species like humans or across species.

Jill Morgan:

And are there things that you thought were going to be

Jill Morgan:

A big deal, I mean, that didn't turn out to be a big deal.

Jill Morgan:

And other things you thought, "Well, yes, this one might do something, but

Jill Morgan:

probably not much of anything." I mean, I think you just mentioned that, for

Jill Morgan:

instance, the ongoing Ebola outbreak and the Bundibugyo strain of Ebola,

Jill Morgan:

which is just a terrible tragedy in Democratic Republic of the Congo, but

Jill Morgan:

not probably likely for many reasons to necessarily become a worldwide pandemic

Jill Morgan:

the way, of course, we did with COVID.

Jill Morgan:

But I think people wonder what will be the next big thing.

Jill Morgan:

And so I wonder, looking back over your career, are there things you really

Jill Morgan:

worried about that didn't come true?

Jill Morgan:

Are there things you thought, "Oh, that's probably okay," and then you were like,

Jill Morgan:

"Oh my gosh, that one ended up to be much worse than we thought it was going to be"?

Stephen Morse:

We've always worked with lists; people tend to like lists

Stephen Morse:

because, you know, it's like going to the grocery store, you know what you

Stephen Morse:

have to… Nowadays, I don't know if you can afford it, but you know what

Stephen Morse:

you, you're supposed to buy anyway.

Stephen Morse:

So it makes it kind of a, seem like a finite universe

Stephen Morse:

that's bounded in some way.

Stephen Morse:

And I think the whole point of the concept that we developed of emerging

Stephen Morse:

viruses and emerging infections was really to be prepared for surprises.

Stephen Morse:

Certainly, you know, when we think about what might have been high on our list,

Stephen Morse:

things like influenza pandemics and smallpox, although that was eradicated,

Stephen Morse:

there were obviously, you know, other ways we thought about terrorists or

Stephen Morse:

accidents that might occur that might somehow release smallpox into the world.

Stephen Morse:

And of course, with so few people now having been vaccinated or having

Stephen Morse:

any immunity after the eradication of smallpox, that was a great event to

Stephen Morse:

celebrate, but it also meant that we had a population highly susceptible.

Stephen Morse:

So these were always on the list.

Stephen Morse:

And for those in the military in biodefense, of course, anthrax was

Stephen Morse:

high on the list and things that had been historically important.

Stephen Morse:

But I think the whole idea was to think about how do you become prepared

Stephen Morse:

for surprise, for not having just a list, which, you know, you do have to

Stephen Morse:

have things that we know are likely.

Stephen Morse:

For example, the, uh, ones I mentioned, influenza, being

Stephen Morse:

notorious for those pandemics.

Stephen Morse:

But on the other hand, also to be ready for something

Stephen Morse:

that we had never anticipated.

Stephen Morse:

I think in reality, nobody expected coronaviruses to suddenly be the cause

Stephen Morse:

of a major pandemic, and yet it was.

Stephen Morse:

We were all waiting perhaps for an influenza pandemic, and that would've been

Stephen Morse:

a reasonable thing to expect, although we had no idea when or exactly how.

Stephen Morse:

But we knew what characteristics to look for.

Stephen Morse:

So the idea was to really have a, a framework for thinking about and

Stephen Morse:

looking for what might be on its way to becoming the next pandemic.

Stephen Morse:

And so I've avoided the list-making because I think it tends to narrow

Stephen Morse:

our imagination, narrow our vision to what might actually be happening.

Jill Morgan:

Yeah.

Jill Morgan:

And I know that you mentioned this idea of preparedness and thinking about this,

Jill Morgan:

and, and certainly you were instrumental in the early days, and, please

Jill Morgan:

Correct me if I'm wrong, but of DARPA.

Jill Morgan:

So that's the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency that really thinks

Jill Morgan:

about these things, in terms of how do we maintain function and order, and

Jill Morgan:

how can we make a strategic defense against these things that might

Jill Morgan:

hit us like that in a, in a pandemic?

Stephen Morse:

Yeah, and in fact, DARPA was, has a very interesting history.

Stephen Morse:

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, originally ARPA, but it was always

Stephen Morse:ted in response to Sputnik in:Stephen Morse:

because the, it was a great-- Sputnik was a great technological surprise.

Stephen Morse:

Nobody knew that the Soviet Union had this capability for launching anything

Stephen Morse:

like a satellite into space, and we weren't quite prepared for that.

Stephen Morse:

So, DARPA, or ARPA as it was then called, was chartered in the Defense

Stephen Morse:

Department as, uh, an agency that would be, in fact, looking for future

Stephen Morse:

technologies and trying to anticipate the future, and the words of the charter

Stephen Morse:

are to prevent technological surprise.

Stephen Morse:

And so ARPA, in its past, long before I, I came there, and I can take no

Stephen Morse:

personal credit, uh, started the basis of the internet, which was originally the

Stephen Morse:

ARPANET, and we're talking today on the more advanced and much more modern version

Stephen Morse:ven exist in this form in the:Stephen Morse:

thinking about what to do for improving surveillance of emerging infections

Stephen Morse:

and other infections in general.

Stephen Morse:

So this technology has advanced quite a bit.

Stephen Morse:But before the:Stephen Morse:

of course, you know, thinking about concerns like the eradication of

Stephen Morse:

smallpox, a wonderful, really signal event, the first and only human

Stephen Morse:

infectious disease to be eradicated intentionally by human effort.

Stephen Morse:

There's one other, but that's a, an animal disease called rinderpest, uh, which was

Stephen Morse:

also important in the veterinary field.

Stephen Morse:

But, you know, that's all we've actually, intentionally managed to, uh,

Stephen Morse:

eradicate in terms of human infections.

Stephen Morse:

There may have been some we've driven to extinction by

Stephen Morse:

accident, but without knowing it.

Stephen Morse:

But, at ARPA decided, DARPA then decided that, you know, it was important,

Stephen Morse:

the director at the time, Larry Lynn, decided it, it was important to

Stephen Morse:

really think about biology and that biology would be the next new thing.

Stephen Morse:

ARPA had already worked for years; DARPA had already worked for years on things

Stephen Morse:

like material science, the foundation of the internet, which it then handed

Stephen Morse:

over to the National Science Foundation, and a number of other things, the silicon

Stephen Morse:

chip, and a number of other things that were mostly engineering-type advances.

Stephen Morse:

And, I think significant ones in many ways, often not recognized because

Stephen Morse:

DARPA tended to keep a low profile.

Stephen Morse:

But, on the other hand, Biology was something that DARPA had

Stephen Morse:

not really thought about it.

Stephen Morse:

These were all, you know, engineering, what the engineers

Stephen Morse:

would call bending metal.

Stephen Morse:

And that kind of soft work, you know, the, the working in the lab,

Stephen Morse:

thinking about biology, biotechnology.

Stephen Morse:

I think the director then, Larry Lynn, was very forward-looking, and

Stephen Morse:

he had a task force working on that.

Stephen Morse:

Josh Lederberg, in fact, chaired that.

Stephen Morse:

And, that's how I ended up, through those connections, becoming one of

Stephen Morse:

the first, not the first, but one of the first biologists at DARPA.

Stephen Morse:

They had a couple of people with medical and other backgrounds

Stephen Morse:

who were beginning the rudiments of a biology program at DARPA.

Stephen Morse:

And, and then I came in as, as probably the third person in, in,

Stephen Morse:

in the biological sciences, which was then thought of as being, you

Stephen Morse:

know, a little outside DARPA's realm.

Stephen Morse:

But of course, was right.

Stephen Morse:

You know, biotechnology has grown tremendously, but also has become a

Stephen Morse:

very important technology, in line with computers and informatics

Stephen Morse:

as well, which have also grown.

Stephen Morse:

DARPA has had, and a number of other agencies have had a lot to do with that.

Stephen Morse:

So the National Institutes of Health had always been the major funder for

Stephen Morse:

uh, biomedical research and still, you know, is a very important, I think

Stephen Morse:

really essential funder for fundamental biological research and for funding

Stephen Morse:

clinical trials and translation from the bench to the, as they say,

Stephen Morse:

to the bedside, to the laboratory.

Stephen Morse:

DARPA's idea was really to push the envelope on thinking about

Stephen Morse:

new ideas and new technologies.

Stephen Morse:

This is what DARPA always does to uh, improve our capabilities to

Stephen Morse:

deal with biological threats, and also to use the tools of biology

Stephen Morse:

to, um, produce useful outcomes that could help benefit human existence

Jill Morgan:

Wow.

Jill Morgan:

So I, I'm thinking about that, uh, and thinking about how

Jill Morgan:

these things have changed over the course of, of your career.

Jill Morgan:

I, I, I hadn't really thought about the AI piece that I think people are

Jill Morgan:

concerned about now, but, but you were really, you know, in the beginning of

Jill Morgan:

when people were just starting to think about any of these emerging pathogens

Jill Morgan:

being a national defense interest.

Jill Morgan:

And now I think, you know, that's sort of morphed into there is this worldwide

Jill Morgan:

science knowledge base, but could people, I think, as one of our former presidents

Jill Morgan:

called them evildoers, could evildoers, um, you know, tap into some of this

Jill Morgan:

widely available science and m- muck with the viruses that we know are, are,

Jill Morgan:

you know, perhaps, uh, on the list or not on the list of ones that we think could

Jill Morgan:

be, could be really problematic, uh, if they were released or created a new one.

Jill Morgan:

Um, and I hadn't even thought about asking you about that because I

Jill Morgan:

really didn't think about that aspect of DARPA, but I just wonder

Jill Morgan:

what your insight is about that.

Stephen Morse:

Yeah, it, it's actually an interesting question because in

Stephen Morse:

the old days, the United States, of course, completely got out of the

Stephen Morse:

biological, of any kind of offensive biological warfare or biological weapons

Stephen Morse:

research, development, or of course never really been used in practice,

Stephen Morse:completely got out of that in:Stephen Morse:

And although there are skeptics, including in the former Soviet

Stephen Morse:

Union, who believe that we really just had a secret program somewhere, you

Stephen Morse:

know, the fact is that that was an area that the United States simply,

Stephen Morse:

under Nixon of all people, decided was, was not, you know, really something we

Stephen Morse:

should be doing, and that with other types of weapons, it perhaps was

Stephen Morse:

not really, uh, something desirable.

Stephen Morse:

It in fact was not desirable, and we should set a good example by

Stephen Morse:

eschewing the use of biological, any kind of biological offensive

Stephen Morse:

research or development or use.

Stephen Morse:

And there's a treaty to that effect from about that period, which is still, how

Stephen Morse:

to make it, how to put teeth into it to make it, um, you know, really verifiable

Stephen Morse:

or at least, somehow more, possible to, to check is, has still been difficult.

Stephen Morse:

It's still a subject under discussion.

Stephen Morse:

And, in an earlier life when I was still in academe before going to DARPA,

Stephen Morse:

I used to go to WHO occasionally and observe or listen in, or sometimes talk

Stephen Morse:

at the, uh, meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention, talking about how

Stephen Morse:

to improve the, how to improve our ways of assessing compliance with the treaty.

Stephen Morse:

But back in the old days of World War II, for example, when the Allies

Stephen Morse:

got together to try to find, perhaps, develop anything they could there

Stephen Morse:

were no nuclear weapons, and it was a battle for existential battle for

Stephen Morse:

survival and an existential question.

Stephen Morse:

So, there was work at that time on biological, how you could use biological

Stephen Morse:

agents, and those were almost all zoonotic agents coming from nature,

Stephen Morse:

like anthrax and all the familiar ones.

Stephen Morse:

There was some work with botulism.

Stephen Morse:

There was some work with a number of other things.

Stephen Morse:

Tularemia, for example, a bacterial infection that's still found in nature.

Stephen Morse:

And all of these came from nature, and even then, you know, it was,

Stephen Morse:

uh, vaccines were developed for many of those for limited use, you

Stephen Morse:

know, in those who might be exposed.

Stephen Morse:

But, in many ways, it turned out that there were other ways to wage war

Stephen Morse:

that were perhaps, uh, they were thought of at the time early on to be

Stephen Morse:

perhaps, um, more a, a gentler way.

Stephen Morse:

Someone wrote a book called "A Higher Form of Killing," which

Stephen Morse:

is kind of an ironic title.

Stephen Morse:

I had nothing to do with it, and I don't support the idea.

Stephen Morse:

But the idea being that it's, it's nicer than being gassed, as in World

Stephen Morse:

War I, or blown up, and that you could have incapacitating biological

Stephen Morse:

agents that could knock out the combatant's ability, a soldier or a

Stephen Morse:

sailor's ability to fight or to work.

Stephen Morse:

And, you know, most of the the downtime in any military is

Stephen Morse:

disease, non-battle injury, and it's very often infectious diseases.

Stephen Morse:

We saw that as we prepared for World War I with the great influenza

Stephen Morse:pandemic of:Stephen Morse:

but it was largely transmitted through close quarters in military

Stephen Morse:

training and in the wartime setting.

Stephen Morse:

It can be, I think, in general, the leadership of the military didn't

Stephen Morse:

like the idea because these were highly unpredictable to them.

Stephen Morse:

They understood how explosives worked and things like that, and where to put

Stephen Morse:

them, but they, you know, and artillery.

Stephen Morse:

But it was, it was much more difficult to calculate what might happen if one

Stephen Morse:

released some kind of biological agent.

Stephen Morse:

But, you know, many of, of these original research

Stephen Morse:

efforts go back to that period.

Stephen Morse:

And of course, we're out of that for a long time.

Stephen Morse:

And DARPA has been, obviously, never in it because it was formed

Stephen Morse:

very close to the time in the late '50s, was never really doing biology.

Stephen Morse:

And by the time it got interested in biology, we were already, we had already

Stephen Morse:

essentially dismantled, completely dismantled and really abandoned the

Stephen Morse:

whole idea officially of having any kind, as well as unofficially, of having any

Stephen Morse:

kind of offensive biological program.

Stephen Morse:

On the other hand, there was still the need for defense.

Stephen Morse:

And DARPA saw that after some things that had happened, for example, in the

Stephen Morse:

first Gulf War and in other places where there was thought, and some thought about

Stephen Morse:

other countries and other situations where there might be biological weapons

Stephen Morse:

being worked on or actually available to militaries in some other countries.

Stephen Morse:example, admitted that until:Stephen Morse:

President Yeltsin, when he became president of what was then, I guess, the

Stephen Morse:

Russian Federation admitted that until the 90s, they were still working on some

Stephen Morse:

biological… Never used, of course, but on developing, uh, biological agents.

Stephen Morse:

And there were some accidents that became very famous in Siberia, for

Stephen Morse:

example, where, in fact, Yeltsin was the party secretary and would have

Stephen Morse:

known a great deal about the accidents, of anthrax at Sverdlovsk, now called--

Stephen Morse:

uh, then called Sverdlovsk.

Stephen Morse:

In the old days, it was Yekaterinburg, and I think it is again.

Stephen Morse:

So we knew other countries might be interested s- and

Stephen Morse:

still working on these things.

Stephen Morse:

And nature was there, and that was our main concern, really, you know,

Stephen Morse:

because the pathogens are there.

Stephen Morse:

I was worried about, you know, the emerging infections.

Stephen Morse:

But they were all out there, and so, what would be successful for biological defense

Stephen Morse:

against, a-against human-induced threats, you know, should also be effective.

Stephen Morse:

We were looking for ways to be effective against the natural threats.

Stephen Morse:

And so, one of the programs that I, when I came to DARPA, that I co-managed,

Stephen Morse:

was called-- I, I didn't give it that name, but my colleague did, uh,

Stephen Morse:

Unconventional pathogen Countermeasures.

Stephen Morse:

And the idea really was to look at the mechanisms of pathogenesis, the way

Stephen Morse:

that these pathogens cause disease, cause people to become sick, and

Stephen Morse:

you know, how do you somehow block those mechanisms of pathogenesis?

Stephen Morse:

In some cases, that might be by augmenting the immune response, and

Stephen Morse:

in fact, that's what vaccines do.

Stephen Morse:

But that's, um, you know… It, it's a very good solution where

Stephen Morse:

it exists and where it's feasible

Jill Morgan:

Right

Stephen Morse:

But, you know, in a sudden pandemic like the one we

Stephen Morse:

had with just now with COVID-19, uh, you know, that's obviously…

Stephen Morse:

It, it took a while, and that was about as fast as, as quickly as anyone could

Stephen Morse:

make a vaccine using the, uh, as yet-untested mRNA technology that had

Stephen Morse:

been, you know, they had been looking for a good commercial opportunity for

Stephen Morse:

a long time, and here it came because there was no vaccine available and

Stephen Morse:

nothing that could be made quickly.

Stephen Morse:

It takes quite a lot of planning to do this by conventional means.

Stephen Morse:

And, you know, so I think that demonstrate, yes, vaccines could be

Stephen Morse:

very helpful, but they still took time, and they had to be delivered.

Stephen Morse:

You know, it wasn't enough to have a vaccine; you had to have people who

Stephen Morse:

are vaccinated, and we've seen all the questions that have come up there.

Stephen Morse:

But were there other mechanisms using, for example, innate immunity,

Stephen Morse:

discovered by one of my colleagues at Rockefeller, Bruce Beutler, who,

Stephen Morse:

uh, shared a Nobel Prize for that.

Stephen Morse:

So, could innate immunity or, you know, sharpening the immune system to

Stephen Morse:

respond more rapidly to pathogens or looking at mechanisms of pathogenesis,

Stephen Morse:

the way that these viruses and other pathogens cause disease so that you

Stephen Morse:

could block those mechanisms, prevent a, um, anthrax from making the toxin.

Stephen Morse:

You know, what is the signal that causes it to propagate and make the toxin?

Stephen Morse:

Prevent it from doing that, so, uh, you could, um, turn off, if you

Stephen Morse:

will, turn off the lights or pull out the teeth from these, these pathogens

Stephen Morse:

so they would no longer be harmful or improve the immune response in humans

Stephen Morse:

without having to wait for a vaccine.

Stephen Morse:

So we were looking at some of the underlying mechanisms that were really

Stephen Morse:

common to a lot of different pathogens and could, you know, didn't require you

Stephen Morse:

to know in advance what that pathogen was.

Stephen Morse:

That was, you know, what DARPA was trying to do.

Stephen Morse:

Uh, later we spun off a program called Advanced Diagnostics, for

Stephen Morse:

which I was, uh, the program manager myself and led that program.

Stephen Morse:

And a number of interesting diagnostic ideas, including nanopore

Stephen Morse:

sequencing, came out of the, uh, in part of the funding from that program.

Stephen Morse:

Another one was everyone, of course, was funding the so-called PCR on a

Stephen Morse:

chip, which we now know as the Cepheid GeneXpert, and a number of other things.

Stephen Morse:

We were looking for early markers of infection that might at least help you

Stephen Morse:

to know who was exposed and separate out those who actually were exposed

Stephen Morse:

from the so-called worried well, the people who had been in the area, but

Stephen Morse:

you could triage them as requiring reassurance but not requiring, perhaps

Stephen Morse:

the immediate limited resources that could be available for that.

Stephen Morse:

So that was an ambitious goal, but DARPA's always looking for ambitious

Stephen Morse:

goals, and some of them actually, you know, I think did result in products

Stephen Morse:

that are now commercially available, which was the idea, and available to

Stephen Morse:

help improve people's lives and prevent, uh, preventable, in this

Stephen Morse:

case, suffering and, and, and death.

Jill Morgan:

Yeah.

Jill Morgan:

And so is there something that worries you now?

Jill Morgan:

Uh, whether it's in terms of our preparedness, our, our focus, perhaps,

Jill Morgan:

as you mentioned earlier, we, we continue to invade more and more of

Jill Morgan:

nature and wildlife and natural areas and coming into contact with things

Jill Morgan:

that we weren't in contact before.

Jill Morgan:

Are there things that just niggle at the back of your brain at night

Jill Morgan:

that you think, "Gosh, that's really, that's really what worries me"?

Stephen Morse:

You know, they're, they're quite, quite--

Stephen Morse:

thank, thank you for asking.

Stephen Morse:

There are quite a few, the SARS coronavirus too, as the viral- as we

Stephen Morse:

virologists, I- I'm, I'm, I'm sort of a, a backsliding or reformed virologist,

Stephen Morse:

who, as you know, I, uh, had thought I would spend my entire career in the

Stephen Morse:

lab and was trained in the lab as a lab virologist or as a lab scientist.

Stephen Morse:

And then, you know, at Rockefeller, I, I was working in the lab, but got very

Stephen Morse:

interested in these questions.

Stephen Morse:

So, decided that, uh, you know, if I really had the courage of my convictions

Stephen Morse:

and wanted to try to do something about this, I should go to where it might be

Stephen Morse:

possible to actually work at the, the cliché is the pointy tip of the spear

Stephen Morse:

or the where the rubber meets the road.

Stephen Morse:

Those are the clichés we all used in Washington, but basically, you know, try

Stephen Morse:

to work upstream from that, so which is how I ended up going to a school of

Stephen Morse:

public health, the Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, as an

Stephen Morse:

epidemiologist, because that was the department that seemed most appropriate.

Stephen Morse:

But the idea was really to think about ways that, you know, and try to put into

Stephen Morse:

effect ways that might prevent the repeats of some of the things

Stephen Morse:

we've seen with various pandemics.

Stephen Morse:

And one thing that does worry me is, you know, I think we have a lack

Stephen Morse:

of imagination, a lack of urgency, and a lack of ability to sustain

Stephen Morse:

momentum with all of these things.

Stephen Morse:

So, you know, we had influenza pandemics, and I-- that's still

Stephen Morse:

high on my list because we know those are, you know, so far they

Stephen Morse:

seem to be pretty much inevitable.

Stephen Morse:

Don't know exactly what influenza virus will be responsible, only that it's going

Stephen Morse:

to be some influenza type A that humans have not been exposed to before in some

Stephen Morse:

way, usually with a novel hemagglutinin.

Stephen Morse:

That's the surface protein that I- it also has the receptor binding site.

Stephen Morse:

You know, so influenza pandemics seem to be, pretty much, at least

Stephen Morse:

for the last couple of centuries, if not more, a fact of nature.

Stephen Morse:

So I think that we don't know exactly the conditions when, but that's

Stephen Morse:

something that bears close watching.

Stephen Morse:

The coronaviruses obviously have risen to gain attention.

Stephen Morse:

But I think we got a lot of lessons from past events, and I've read a

Stephen Morse:of papers after the Ebola of:Stephen Morse:

completely, as you know, completely gone from both our memory and reality.

Stephen Morse:

There was a lot of, a lot written about the lessons learned from

Stephen Morse:

that, and I think very little of it has actually been implemented.

Stephen Morse:

We have a lot written about the lessons from this last pandemic, and I think

Stephen Morse:

many of them are exactly the same as we've had from previous after-action reports.

Stephen Morse:

And that's why I think that your network, why NETEC is really an essential thing.

Stephen Morse:

It was very forward-looking to have developed this network of centers where

Stephen Morse:

people, of facilities where people could be put into isolation if they had some

Stephen Morse:

very serious high-consequence pathogen and also required the level of care

Stephen Morse:

that would not be possible in a place like the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Stephen Morse:

You know, simply requiring a level of care or a place like even Sierra Leone,

Stephen Morse:

or any of these other countries under the best of circumstances, obviously,

Stephen Morse:

you know, we can do much more with the equipment and the training we have here.

Stephen Morse:

And, so I think that was a great idea, and of course, the training, we've all

Stephen Morse:

heard about PPE and, you know, many of us are not really fully trained in

Stephen Morse:

using it because we have very little occasion to use it for high-consequence…

Stephen Morse:

Hopefully, we won't have many occasions to use it for high-consequence pathogens.

Stephen Morse:

So that training, I think, is really an important part of it.

Stephen Morse:

I wish that more people had known, about some of these precautions

Stephen Morse:

when this pandemic came along.

Stephen Morse:

Not the profession, not your group.

Stephen Morse:

That's why I think your group is really important, you know, both for what you

Stephen Morse:

can do in terms of patient care and understanding of these pathogens and

Stephen Morse:

protecting us by isolating patients, but also protecting us by getting the word

Stephen Morse:

out about what people can do to protect themselves, because a lot of that became

Stephen Morse:

highly polarized, highly politicized, and highly debated during this last pandemic.

Stephen Morse:

And yet in many other countries, outside of the Western Hemisphere, you know,

Stephen Morse:

masking and, and even in places like Korea, they were using not N95s as, as

Stephen Morse:

we might hear of PAPRs, but ordinary people were using the 94 rather than

Stephen Morse:

95, but they were very sophisticated about using these in Korea, and

Stephen Morse:

they were very good about responding in general to the initial outbreaks

Stephen Morse:

of SARS-CoV-2, of COVID-19.

Stephen Morse:

You know, I think we were very slow off the mark there.

Stephen Morse:

I think some of it may have been willful in ignorance, or a failure of imagination.

Stephen Morse:ew since at least February of:Stephen Morse:

transmitted by symptomatic individuals, unlike perhaps Ebola, with

Stephen Morse:

some of the exceptions we found later with some of the long-term survivors.

Stephen Morse:

But, uh, unlike Ebola, where, you know, it seems mostly symptomatic

Stephen Morse:

individuals are at the… and, and of course, during burial rites, people

Stephen Morse:

who have died of it are most likely or for passing on the infection.

Stephen Morse:

With COVID, you know, it was, uh, the asymptomatic

Stephen Morse:

and the pre-symptomatics.

Stephen Morse:ssion as early as February of:Stephen Morse:

and yet very little was done about that.

Stephen Morse:

We focused on the symptoms just as if it were Ebola or something like that, but

Stephen Morse:

a highly transmissible one, unlike Ebola.

Stephen Morse:

So, I think there are a lot of lessons still to be learned, and one

Stephen Morse:

thing that I was particularly interested in, as you know, is surveillance,

Stephen Morse:

improving our surveillance systems.

Stephen Morse:After the:Stephen Morse:

of us got together and actually started something called ProMED, the Program

Stephen Morse:

for Monitoring Emerging Diseases, and it seems very; it was basically an open

Stephen Morse:

email listserv to anyone who wanted.

Stephen Morse:

Later it went on the web, uh, after the Kikwit Ebola incident or the Kikwit

Stephen Morse:largest Ebola outbreak before:Stephen Morse:

But encouraged by early adopters of technology like Josh Lederberg and

Stephen Morse:

others, we decided to go, uh, email, which then was a very arduous thing.

Stephen Morse:

And so it was a very primitive system because most of the world didn't have

Stephen Morse:

access to the internet, which shows you how different things are in the last

Stephen Morse:

20 or 30 years, how far we've gone in having immediate communications

Stephen Morse:

capabilities and even rapid, with some of the sequencing capabilities we have

Stephen Morse:

now, rapid detection and identification.

Stephen Morse:

Some of my colleagues do what they like to call virus hunting, you know, using

Stephen Morse:

a variety of technologies that are now available for sequencing or even finding

Stephen Morse:

the needle in a haystack, the pathogen sequence, and being able to identify it

Stephen Morse:

or see if it's something new, in a, a, an impure environmental or clinical sample.

Stephen Morse:ally possible even in the mid:Stephen Morse:

Email took hours to do, by a very primitive line editor.

Stephen Morse:

You know, it would usually take me, uh, hours to write an email.

Stephen Morse:

Still does, but I'm a slow writer.

Stephen Morse:

But, but it was very hard to do, and you felt lucky if it got there the next day.

Stephen Morse:

Now we expect instantaneous responses.

Stephen Morse:

So we have great technological tools, but we haven't done any better with this

Stephen Morse:

particular, uh, the last pandemic of COVID-19 than we did with earlier pandemics.

Stephen Morse:

No pandemic has ever really been stopped, and one of the things I'm

Stephen Morse:

very concerned about is, you know, how can we stop them at that early stage?

Stephen Morse:

Maybe they can be stopped locally, but once they get outside a region or, or sort

Stephen Morse:

of, you know, i-i-into an area as, many of these pandemics, in fact, all of them have,

Stephen Morse:

where they may be able to encounter other human beings and spread, like going from,

Stephen Morse:

it initially, uh, started in China with SARS coronavirus 2, COVID-19, to Europe.

Stephen Morse:

How do you prevent it from making that leap to other parts of the world?

Stephen Morse:

And I don't think we've really organized ourselves to do that, and that worries

Stephen Morse:

me a lot because there was a real lesson there, and it was a very painful one.

Stephen Morse:

We should have been able to stop it.

Stephen Morse:

And the same thing is true of mpox, which has become a pandemic.

Stephen Morse:

After smallpox was eradicated, we knew that related pox viruses

Stephen Morse:

were out there, and they seemed to have limited transmissibility.

Stephen Morse:

But HIV has very limited transmissibility too, but it had a number of other

advantages:

long period, long duration of infectivity, and of course,

advantages:

various human behaviors, including medical technology through the blood

advantages:

supply or intravenous drug use.

advantages:

So, these things are highways, if you will, pathogen highways or

advantages:

highways for emerging virus traffic.

advantages:

And these highways still exist, and we haven't done much to block them,

advantages:

and I'm very concerned about that.

advantages:

You know, it should have been possible to stop, something like, or at least

advantages:

slow down considerably, something like the COVID pandemic or even mpox, even

advantages:

more so because we've been practicing for something even worse, a possibility

advantages:

of an accidental or perhaps intentional smallpox release by a bioterrorist

advantages:

or whatever, you know, which would have devastating consequences.

advantages:

And that scenario has been practiced ever since smallpox was eradicated

advantages:officially in:advantages:

around that, being prepared for that.

advantages:

Mpox showed how unprepared we really were because the same precautions for

advantages:

smallpox would have worked perfectly well for mpox if we had them in place

advantages:

and would've been much easier because it's not quite as transmissible.

advantages:

And there was fear that maybe monkeypox would establish

advantages:

itself in the human population.

advantages:

Many of us thought this was far-fetched, but it looks like

advantages:

it's on the way to doing that, although it's too soon to tell.

advantages:

So I'm really worried about the lack of imagination and the lack of a sense

advantages:

of urgency that we sometimes see.

advantages:

That worries me more than any of the individual pathogens because we, we

advantages:

never know what's gonna come next.

advantages:

And when it does, although we have some good suspects, and when it

advantages:

does, we really should be prepared.

advantages:

We've been working on it for so long.

advantages:

We shouldn't have to re-learn the same lessons each year.

advantages:

So that's what worries me, and especially surveillance capability.

advantages:

I think surveillance, you know, we have to have better global surveillance.

advantages:

I've, I've been an advocate for that for a number of years, so

advantages:

forgive me if I'm repeating myself.

advantages:

But at the same time, we have to use it.

advantages:

Global surveillance and systematic surveillance in the way we would

advantages:

understand it, scientifically and in the public health and medical sense was never

advantages:

really established for SARS coronavirus 2 in almost any country in the world,

advantages:

including, of course, the United States.

advantages:

But had we had a really effective surveillance system, we might have had a

advantages:

a better idea about where the virus was, where it was heading, and how we might be

advantages:

able to head it off, and we wouldn't have to lock down entire countries just because

advantages:

we didn't know where the virus actually was due to a lack of surveillance.

advantages:

So I think that's something that really needs to be improved.

advantages:

But surveillance is information for action, as the CDC called it.

advantages:

It's really the action step that's the most important.

advantages:

What do you do with that information besides disseminating it?

advantages:

People have to have some plan and some tools for dealing with it, so

advantages:

that you don't have to have universal lockdowns because you don't know

advantages:

where it is, or you don't have to wait for the vaccine to come.

advantages:

Some years ago we wrote an article for Science called the Next

Influenza Pandemic:

What Do You Do?

Influenza Pandemic:

What to Do Until the Vaccine Arrives.

Influenza Pandemic:

We all imagined, I, I see now, perhaps naively, that once the vaccine

Influenza Pandemic:

arrived, There's a film, Contagion, which is one of the more accurate

Influenza Pandemic:

in this respect, scientifically.

Influenza Pandemic:

But it's, it's, uh, scientifically as accurate until it gets,

Influenza Pandemic:

of course, out of hand.

Influenza Pandemic:

Now we have more to say about that.

Influenza Pandemic:

But I think it showed very good advice from the people who

Influenza Pandemic:

consulted and very clever scriptwriter, Scott Burns, you know, who really,

Influenza Pandemic:

I think, had a, a very clever plot, but also a very clever mechanism which

Influenza Pandemic:

wasn't divulged until the end, similar to something like some of the other

Influenza Pandemic:

bat-borne viruses like Nipah or Hendra.

Influenza Pandemic:

But on the other hand, we all thought, and that film also sort of, sort

Influenza Pandemic:

of concluded with the vaccine.

Influenza Pandemic:

Once there was a vaccine available, we thought, you know, we could breathe easy,

Influenza Pandemic:

and we now know that that's not enough.

Influenza Pandemic:

So, surveillance itself is necessary but not sufficient.

Influenza Pandemic:

We have to educate, communicate, and also have tools in place so that the

Influenza Pandemic:

entire burden does not fall on the healthcare system, but that we take

Influenza Pandemic:

public health measures to be able to slow to some extent, at least as much

Influenza Pandemic:

as possible, stop the spread before it becomes an enormous pandemic.

Influenza Pandemic:

And that requires time, thought, and political will.

Jill Morgan:

Oh my goodness.

Jill Morgan:

Well, we never have enough of any of those.

Stephen Morse:

Well, we saw political will lacking in most of the pandemics that

Stephen Morse:

you know, have come, including HIV, would probably been very difficult to deal with.

Stephen Morse:

But one of the clear things was lack of political will at the highest levels.

Stephen Morse:

And I began to appreciate how important leadership at the top really is.

Stephen Morse:

It's important to have good, good leadership.

Stephen Morse:

We had experts in place during the beginnings of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Stephen Morse:

You know, I, I know many of the people who were there personally, and

Stephen Morse:

they were excellent people at CDC, at ASPR, for that matter, and elsewhere.

Stephen Morse:

But they simply did not have, unfortunately, and I hate to get into

Stephen Morse:

what may be a touchy subject, there needed to be more political will.

Stephen Morse:

That was true with HIV, and that was true with the last pandemic.

Stephen Morse:

So I'm not sure a lot has changed, but we need to communicate

Stephen Morse:

better to the decision-makers about why this is important.

Jill Morgan:

Absolutely.

Jill Morgan:

I think communicating up, if you will, to the decision-makers, and

Jill Morgan:

then also, I worry as you do about, you know, imagination and

Jill Morgan:

urgency and our attention span.

Jill Morgan:

And I worry among the healthcare community, about complacency and this

Jill Morgan:

idea that, well, those of us who are still here made it through COVID, surely

Jill Morgan:

the next thing won't be any worse.

Jill Morgan:

And that bothers me endlessly.

Jill Morgan:

I worry about us not protecting healthcare workers or healthcare

Jill Morgan:

workers not thinking perhaps that there's something that they really can

Jill Morgan:

do to keep from taking things home.

Jill Morgan:

So, you know, I'm a big, a big advocate for better PPE and better PPE education.

Stephen Morse:

You know, the unavailability of real PPE during

Stephen Morse:

the pandemic, it's become the subject of, of many, I, I'm afraid very sad.

Stephen Morse:

They'd be funny if they weren't very sad anecdotes about different

Stephen Morse:

jurisdictions coming to the airport to try to pick up a shipment of PPE.

Stephen Morse:

They were so rare that in my own institution, at NewYork-Presbyterian,

Stephen Morse:

which is the hospital associated with Columbia as well as Weill

Stephen Morse:

Cornell, uh, medical schools.

Stephen Morse:

There I remember, many of the people who really needed… Everyone needed PPE,

Stephen Morse:

but the very few people who were lucky enough to be able to get N95s could

Stephen Morse:

get two or three really decent PPE.

Stephen Morse:

But, you know, even here, N95s, which should have been abundant, they could get

Stephen Morse:

one or two, and they were, there was a lot of talk about how to reuse N95s?

Stephen Morse:

How can you prepare them for reuse?

Stephen Morse:

We should never have had that discussion.

Stephen Morse:

They should have been as plentiful as in fact they are today

Jill Morgan:

Right.

Stephen Morse:

When we have less im- immediate need for them,

Stephen Morse:

but at least hopefully more, more appreciation, you know.

Stephen Morse:

And, and that was sad.

Jill Morgan:

Yes, it was.

Jill Morgan:

It was sad.

Jill Morgan:

And we lost healthcare workers because of it, both from

Jill Morgan:

burnout and from actual illness.

Jill Morgan:

Uh, it was a, it was a terrible thing.

Jill Morgan:

I wanna, I wanna end, if I can, on a lighter note.

Jill Morgan:

Because I think that it is so amazing for me to listen to this incredible

Jill Morgan:

history, and, you know, some really sobering, I think, ideas about what

Jill Morgan:

we still need to do to move forward in terms of preparedness.

Jill Morgan:

But I want to ask you about how having that vast knowledge

Jill Morgan:

influences your daily life.

Jill Morgan:

So, uh, it's funny to think about, um, my husband's an electrician, and everywhere

Jill Morgan:

he goes, he'll go, "That's not the code. That's not the code." I mean, it's

Jill Morgan:

just part of how he looks at the world.

Jill Morgan:

And I wonder, from inside your brain, how do you look at the world?

Jill Morgan:

Do you think of, of, uh, like a, a, a buffet table as being

Jill Morgan:

just, just a pathogen highway?

Jill Morgan:

Um, do you wash your vegetables in bleach?

Jill Morgan:

I mean, what-- how does this affect your life?

Stephen Morse:

Yeah.

Stephen Morse:

So, I think that's a great question.

Stephen Morse:

So, having been trained as a microbiologist, of, of course,

Stephen Morse:

you know, I wash my hands a lot.

Stephen Morse:

Whether it needs it or not.

Stephen Morse:

Obviously, there's appropriate hygiene that people can use in their daily

Stephen Morse:

lives, and they should, you know?

Stephen Morse:

And, you know, when it comes to food, no, I don't wash my fruits and vegetables

Stephen Morse:

in bleach, although I do… I do rinse my fruits and vegetables very well, you

Stephen Morse:

know, so I'm, I'm careful to always rinse them and, and to do it well, but not

Stephen Morse:

perhaps more than people ordinarily would.

Stephen Morse:

But one thing that is interesting, we've learned about some other

Stephen Morse:

non-pharmaceutical measures for preventing or slowing down infections,

Stephen Morse:

because of this last pandemic of COVID-19, SARS coronavirus 2.

Stephen Morse:

Good hand hygiene, as they tend to call it now.

Stephen Morse:

Don't touch your face.

Stephen Morse:

Wear some kind of mask that fits well.

Stephen Morse:

Doesn't necessarily have to be an N95.

Stephen Morse:

Most people haven't been trained or fit-tested or medically

Stephen Morse:

cleared for using them.

Stephen Morse:

They're good precautions, which of course we're all much too

Stephen Morse:

tired at this point to keep doing.

Stephen Morse:

You know, but I think if we could take some of those precautions, I

Stephen Morse:

think it's, you know, awfully boring to people and seems awfully arduous.

Stephen Morse:

But if we could do some of that, we could also protect ourselves much better.

Stephen Morse:

We should have, you know, of course, the vaccines as well and be taking those.

Stephen Morse:

I'm an advocate of that.

Stephen Morse:

But, you know, we would be able to protect ourselves much better

Stephen Morse:

against the flu and many other respiratory and other infections.

Stephen Morse:

So all these common sense precautions, even though they may sometimes seem

Stephen Morse:

troublesome, could really help a lot of us, including reducing the

Stephen Morse:

burden on our healthcare system.

Stephen Morse:

That may be too much to ask, especially in what's become a rather divided atmosphere

Stephen Morse:

about that, but I think, thinking about these things, I think, is useful.

Stephen Morse:

We learned a lot, you know, about what we could do to protect ourselves, and so we

Stephen Morse:

do have the ability to do a lot to help ourselves and keep ourselves healthier.

Stephen Morse:

Perhaps that's the lesson, because we usually depend on the government to do it,

Stephen Morse:

but in, you know, many cases they somehow do not meet our expectations, although

Stephen Morse:

we're trying and hoping they will, as they have, for example, in your network.

Stephen Morse:

So, you know, please keep, keep at it and keep keeping all the work

Stephen Morse:

you're doing so that flattening the curve doesn't mean giving all the

Stephen Morse:

the cases to the clinicians to have to deal with and, and, you know,

Stephen Morse:

obviously get burned out or overworked.

Stephen Morse:

You know, we, we, we need everyone we can get.

Jill Morgan:

It's absolutely true.

Jill Morgan:

What a great way to wrap up this episode about really a cause to me that you

Jill Morgan:

were instrumental in highlighting at the beginning of many careers, back in

Jill Morgan:

the phrase "emerging viruses" and really, I think, spending a lifetime thinking

Jill Morgan:

about how we can be better prepared.

Jill Morgan:

What a fantastic legacy.

Jill Morgan:

Dr. Morris, thank you so much for joining me today.

Jill Morgan:

It's just been an absolute pleasure.

Jill Morgan:

As we conclude, I want to reiterate what you just said.

Jill Morgan:

Basically, the lesson is if it's wet and it's not yours, don't touch it.

Jill Morgan:

Cover your mouth and nose.

Jill Morgan:

Cover your mouth and nose.

Jill Morgan:

Source control masks really do help to decrease what is floating

Jill Morgan:

around in the air around us, and of course, washing your hands and not

Jill Morgan:

touching your face are key to that.

Jill Morgan:

But I think your contribution is such a great one to our field,

Jill Morgan:

and we greatly appreciate it.

Jill Morgan:

So for those of you listening at home, thank you for tuning in to

Jill Morgan:

this episode with Dr. Stephen Morris.

Jill Morgan:

We hope you'll join us for future episodes on a wide range of topics, from

Jill Morgan:

healthcare worker safety to personal protective equipment, and more about

Jill Morgan:

infectious diseases of all kinds.

Jill Morgan:

If you have questions for NETEC or ideas for future shows, please feel

Jill Morgan:

free to contact us at info@netec.org.

Jill Morgan:

That's info at  info@netec.org, and you can find us on the web at

Jill Morgan:

netec.org/podcast, where you can also subscribe to future shows.

Jill Morgan:

So thank you very much, and we'll see you next time on "Transmission Interrupted."

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